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Invasion of Privacy-Recovery for Nonconsentual
Use of Photographs in Motion Pictures Based on
the Appropriation of Property
From the time Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis wrote
their article entitled "The Right of Privacy"' in 1890, the thrust of
most privacy suits has been for an injury to feelings.2 They suggested
the right of privacy, although originating in property, should never-
theless be given separate and distinct recognition. Warren and Bran-
deis felt its basis should be on injury to feelings rather than injury
to property.8 This theory was accepted by many legal authorities. 4
Twelve years after Warren and Brandeis' article was written, Rober-
son v. Rochester Folding Box Co. 5 was decided in New York. The
court denied recovery for a cause of action based on injury to the
plaintiff's feelings. It stated any change in the law must come as a
result of legislative action. Nevertheless, three years later a Georgia
court in Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co.6 clearly estab-
lished a right of privacy premised on the "injury to feelings." The
court in recognizing this "new" right of privacy said:
It, therefore, follows from what has been said that a violation of
the right of privacy is a direct invasion of a legal right of the indi-
1. 4 HARv. L. Rav. 193 (1890) [hereinafter cited as Warren & Brandeis].
2. Gordon, Right of Property In Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 Nw. U.L.
Rav. 553 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Gordon]. The article is devoted to an extensive
analysis of the invasion of privacy through the appropriation of property. Although
there has been a large amount of litigation since its writing, including the passage of the
California privacy statute, CAL. Cxv. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1971), it still is a good be-
ginning for a thorough understanding of the concept.
3. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 204-05.
4. Gordon, supra note 2, at 554.
5. 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). The plaintiff argued that her feelings were injured
by the defendant's conduct. The defendant had taken plaintiff's picture without her
consent and used it on a calender advertising his flour mill. The court, while recognizing
that an injury had occurred, still refused to grant this "new" right.
6. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905). The defendant used the plaintiff's photograph
without his consent in an advertisement. The plaintiff was depicted as a healthy person;
below the photograph were the words, "In my healthy and productive period of life I
bought insurance in the New England Mutual Life Insurance Company." Next to the
plaintiff's picture was a photograph of a sickly person who, so it seemed, did not purchase
an insurance policy.
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vidual. It is a tort, and it is not necessary that special damages
should have accrued from its violation in order to entitle the ag-
grieved party to recover.... In an action for an invasion of such
a right the damages to be recovered are those for which the law
authorizes a recovery in torts of that character, and, if the law
authorizes a recovery of damages for wounded feelings in other
torts of a similar nature, such damages would be recoverable in
an action for a violation of this right.7
Pavesich clearly established a right of privacy based on injury to
feelings and it has been cited frequently for its well-reasoned analysis.8
Since the creation of the right of privacy, it has become a "catch-
all" tort which, consequently, has led to much confusion. In some cases
plaintiffs have sued for injury to feelings when they should have
based their cause of action on appropriation of their property. An
example of this is O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co.9 Plaintiff, a well-known
college football player, was seeking nationwide publicity. The univer-
sity for which he played openly sought publicity and sold his picture
to defendant for one dollar not knowing it would be put on a calendar
advertising beer. Plaintiff sued for invasion of privacy, basing his
claim on "injury to feelings." Since the plaintiff and the university
openly sought publicity, recovery of damages was denied. The court
made it clear that had the plaintiff based his claim on the appropria-
tion of his property they would have granted the relief sought.'0 Thus,
when one is considering a privacy suit it is important to ask upon
which theory will recovery be sought. If there is no basis to claim
injury to feelings, it would be foolish to bring suit on these grounds.
Instead, a better theory would be appropriation of one's property.
The right to control one's picture, likeness, and name could well be
the property right involved."
7. Id. at 202, 50 S.E. at 73 (emphasis added).
8. Gordon, supra note 2, at 559.
9. 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1941).
10. Justice Holmes, dissenting in O'Brien, argued relief could have been granted for
appropriation, although it was not pleaded. He said:
... the right of privacy is distinct from the right to use one's name or picture for pur-
poses of commercial advertisement. The latter is a property right that belongs to
everyone; it may have much or little, or only a nominal value; but it is a personal
right which may not be violated with impunity.
Id. at 170.
11. It can be argued on the other hand that although one should have a property
right to his photograph or image, since the image is incapable of being possessed, the
right is not one of "property." For example, one could take another's picture and capture
it on film. The film itself belongs to he who has taken the picture, yet the image is
that of the subject of the photograph. If then anyone can capture another's image with
"his" film, who "owns" the photograph? Can the subject go up to the photographer and
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If someone has used another's photograph, image, or likeness with-
out his consent, injury to feelings is not really applicable. The injury
to the person's feelings might be very slight, or there may be none at
all. For example, if he was a well-known chess player and a parlor
game manufacturer used his name and likeness in connection with
the advertisement of the game in order to enhance its marketability,
his "feelings" have not really been injured. Rather, the injury in
this case is to his "pocket"-he has lost money because the defendant
has not paid him for the commercial use of his photograph. Someone
has taken (appropriated) his name and likeness (property) without
paying him. In this case, were he to bring suit against the game manu-
facturer for invasion of privacy it should be based on appropriation.
Dean Prosser has divided the tort invasion of privacy into four
classifications: 12 intrusion, 3 public disclosure of a private fact,14 plac-
ing plaintiff in a false light in the public eye,15 and appropriation.'"
Unlike the other classifications of privacy, appropriation finds its
basis in property rights rather than injury to feelings.17 Because of
this affinity to property rights, it is difficult to picture it as a tort.
Nevertheless, since "privacy" encompasses so many different concepts
it is not an injustice to so classify it. One must only refer to the torts
of libel, misrepresentation, and slander. Privacy is in a sense a "catch-
all" phrase and as a tort, appropriation continues to be a viable cause
of action in privacy.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF APPROPRIATION
A. At Common Law
The basic premise of the Warren and Brandeis article was found
in property, although they did propose a new theory on which to base
it. They said:
take the image away from him? It is very hard to conceptualize an image as property.
But, as can be seen in the development of the law, this is exactly what the courts have
done.
12. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 802 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
13. Id. at 807.
14. Id. at 809.
15. Id. at 812.
16. Id. at 804. Dean Prosser in his discussion of appropriation does not point out that
appropriation is divided into two areas, injury to feelings, and appropriation of property.
Consequently, his superficial treatment causes a misconception about the nature of the
theory of appropriation.
17. Edison v. Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (Ch. 1907).
360
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The right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life-the
right to be left alone. The right to liberty secures the exercise
of extensive civil privileges; and the term property has grown to
comprise every form of possession-intangible as well as tan-
gible.' 8
In the early development of the law before injury to feelings was
recognized, property rights were the basis of privacy suits.19 To say the
least, it is not a new legal concept. Nevertheless, it has not been used
very often since most suits are based on injury to feelings °
One of the first courts to recognize a right of privacy in property
was the Missouri court in Munden v. Harris2' where it said:
We, therefore, conclude that one has an exclusive right to his
picture, on the score of it being a property right of material profit.
We also, consider it to be a property right of material value, in
that it is one of the modes of securing to a person the enjoyment
of life and the exercise of liberty, and the novelty of the claim
is no objection to relief.22
The litigant in Munden brought his action because the picture of
an infant was used by the defendant to advertise his business. The
advertisement had a photograph of the infant on the left side of a
printed advertisement with the language describing where jewelry for
one's "baby" could be purchased. The infant was plainly recognizable
to the viewing public and the picture was used as an integral part
of the whole advertisement. 23
Similarly, in Edison v. Edison Polyform & Manufacturing Co.,2 4 the
court recognized that the famous inventor had a valuable property
18. 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890); see 73 N.J. Eq. at 141, 67 A. at 394. In Minton v.
Smith, 276 Ill. App. 128 (1934), Edison was cited as the leading case involving the theory
of appropriation.
19. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 2, at 560-61.
20. Gordon has concluded through an analysis of the decided cases that much confusion
and conflict arises because litigants choose to sue in almost every case for invasion of
privacy premised on injury to feelings, rather than for the appropriation of property
rights for commercial exploitation. Gordon, supra note 2, at 554.
21. 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911).
22. Id. at 658, 134 S.W. at 1079. The court in its analysis of this right said,
Property is not necessarily a taxable thing any more than it is always a tangible
thing. It may consist of things incorporeal, and things incorporeal may consist of
rights common in every man. One is not compelled to show that he used or in-
tended to use any right which he has, in order to determine whether it is a valuable
property right of which he cannot be deprived . . . [i]f a man has a right to his
own image as made to appear by his picture it cannot be appropriated by another
without his consent . . ..
Id. at 657-58, 134 S.W. 1078.
23. Id. at 652, 134 S.W. at 1076.
24. 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (Ch. 1907).
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right which could not be used without his consent. Edison was granted
an injunction to prohibit the use of his name and photograph in the
advertisement of the corporation's product.2 5
Edison did not claim injury to his feelings; rather his complaint
alleged appropriation of his property rights in his name, likeness, and
image. The court said where there is injury to property rights, equity
will grant relief.28 The court, in its opinion, said:
If a man's name be his own property, and no less authority than
the United States Supreme Court says it is (Brown Chemical Co.
v. Meyer, 139 U.S. 542 (1891) it is difficult to understand why the
peculiar cast of one's features is not also one's property, and why
its pecuniary value, if it has one, does not belong to its owner
rather than to the person seeking to make an unauthorized use
of it.27
More recently, privacy cases have been decided using the appropria-
tion of property concept. In Uhlaender v. Hendricksen,2 a well-known
baseball player, Ted Uhlaender, sought to enjoin the use of his, as
well as other ball players', names in a parlor game. The court, recogniz-
ing that the appropriation of property was not the same as injury to
feelings, said these litigants had a right to free control of their names.
They could not be used by the defendant in his parlor game without
first obtaining the plaintiffs' permission.2
Both Edison and Uhlaender involved famous people. Nevertheless,
one need not be a famous person in order to recover for appropria-
tion of his property in invasion of privacy. In Canessa v. J.1. Kislack,
Inc.,30 the defendant, a real estate company, helped the plaintiff find
a house to buy. The plaintiff, a war veteran, experienced difficulty
in locating a house to buy because of his large family. The defendant
notified the Jersey Journal of its "good deed" and encouraged the
newspaper to publish a story about Mr. Canessa and his plight in
locating a home. The story was printed and appeared in the news-
paper with the plaintiff's photograph. The defendant real estate com-
pany took reprints of the story and used it for advertisement purposes.
25. Id. at 144, 67 A. at 395.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 144, 67 A. at 395. Not only did the court say that the plaintiff can recover
the pecuniary value for the use of his picture, but that the insignificance of the right
from a pecuniary standpoint does not always bar relief. Id. at 142, 67 A. at 394.
28. 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970).
29. Id. at 1283; accord, Palmer v. Schonhorn, 96 N.J. Super. 27, 232 A.2d 458 (Ch. 1967).
80. 97 N.J. Super. 327, 235 A.2d 62 (L. Div. 1967).
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The Canessa court said there are really two aspects of a privacy suit
based on appropriation. One is injury to feelings; the other property
rights.3' The court said when the plaintiff's claim is based on the
appropriation of his likeness and name for defendant's commercial
benefit, it is an action for an invasion of his property rights and not
for "injury to the person" (feelings).3 2 It should be noted that Mr.
Canessa was not a person well-known to the public. Although his
picture did not have the value of that of Edison or Uhlaender, it was
worth something. "However little or much plaintiff's likeness and name
may be worth, defendant, who has appropriated them for his commercial
benefit, should be made to pay for what he has taken, whatever it may
be worth." 33
This development of case law has firmly established appropriation
of property as a valid premise for a privacy suit. One need not be
a famous person to recover for invasion of his privacy based on ap-
propriation, as evidenced by Canessa.
The logical extension of this concept is the "right of publicity." It
has been held that the exclusive licensee of the right to exploit a
celebrity's name, likeness, or personality owns a proprietary interest
assignable in gross. In Haelan Laboratory, Inc. v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc.8 4 a baseball player entered into a contract entitling another
to exclusive right to use the player's name in connection with the sale
of a commercial product. When the ball player tried to assign this
same right to another company, the court held the first company held
the "right of publicity." In addressing the "right" the court said:
... in addition to and independent of that right of privacy ...
a man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph ...
[f]or it is common knowledge that many prominent persons
(especially actors and ballplayers), far from having their feelings
bruised through public exposure of their likeness, would feel
sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing
advertisement . . . .This right of publicity would usually yield
them no money unless it could be made the subject of an exclu-
sive grant which barred any other advertiser from using their
pictures.35
31. Id. at 352, 235 A. at 76.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 351, 235 A. at 75; accord, Edison v. Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Eq.
136, 67 A. 392 (Ch. 1907).
34. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953), noted in 62 YALE L.J. 1123
(1953) and 41 Gao. L.J. 583 (1953). See also Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 203 (1954).
35. 202 F.2d at 868.
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This is not to say the "ordinary man" is barred from recovering for
the appropriation of his property in his image. The "right of public-
ity" is but an extension of the right to recover for the appropriation
of one's property.36
B. Privacy Statutes
In the year following the Roberson decision the New York legisla-
ture passed a privacy statute.3 7 It authorized either injunctive relief or
damages for the nonconsentual use of a person's portrait or picture in
advertisement or for the purpose of trade. Ostensibly, the statute ap-
pears to be based on the theory of appropriation of property rights.
However, this is not so. In fact, the New York courts have interpreted
it to apply only to cases in which there is an injury to feelings.3 8 This
was made clear in Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc.,39 where a tele-
vision comedian, who conducted a mock campaign for the Presidency,
failed in his attempt to enjoin the marketing of a poster embodying
36. 316 F. Supp. at 1281; cf. Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969). The
court held that the famous baseball star who granted a sporting goods manufacturer
exclusive rights to manufacture baseballs bearing the player's name and to license
others to do so could not recover damages from the manufacturer or meat processor
when the meat processor used the tying in sale of meat products to giving away baseballs
to increase its sales.
37. N.Y. Civ. Ricrwrs LAW § 51 (McKinney 1948).
Action for injunction and for damages. Any person whose name, portrait or picture
is used within this state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without
the written consent first obtained as above provided may maintain an equitable
action in the supreme court of this state against the person, firm or corporation so
using his name, portrait or .picture, to prevent and restrain the -use thereof; and
may also sue and recover damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use
and if defendant shall have knowlingly used such person's name, portrait or picture
in such manner as is forbidden or declared to be unlawful by the last section, the
jury, in its discretion, may award exemplary damages. But nothing contained in this
act shall be so construed as to prevent any person, firm or corporation, practicing
the profession of photography, from exhibiting in or about his or its establishment
specimens of the work of such establishment, unless the same is continued by such
person, firm or corporation after written notice objecting thereto has been given by
the person portrayed; and nothing contained in this act shall be so construed as to
prevent any person, firm or corporation from using the name, portrait or picture of
any manufacturer or dealer in connection with the goods, wares and merchandise
manufactured, produced or dealt in by him which he has sold or disposed of with
such name, portrait or picture used in connection therewith; or from using the name,
portrait or picture of any author, composer, or artist in connection with his literary,
musical, or artistic productions which he has sold or disposed of with such name
portrait or picture used in connection therewith.
38. Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 278 App. Div. 431, 106 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1951); Wrangell
v. C.F. Hathaway Co., 22 App. Div. 2d 649, 253 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1964). It can be argued that
even though New York has provided the public with a privacy statute based on injury
to feelings, the common law basis of appropriation is still a viable cause of action. Never-
theless, all privacy suits in New York are brought under its privacy statutes.
39. 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
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his photograph. The court noted the plaintiff was not really interested
in his feelings, but rather the financial benefits attached to his name
and picture. This concept, known as the "right of publicity," is not
recognized in New York. The court said:
It has been made clear that the purpose of the statute is to redress
injury for invasion of a "person's right to be let alone," with
recovery being grounded on the mental strain, distress, humilia-
tion, and disturbance of the peace of mind suffered by such per-
son, hardly what plaintiff here seeks, and the statute was not
enacted to fill gaps in the copyright law or to afford substitute
relief for breaches of contract or violations of various other
species of property rights. 40
California, in 1971, became the second state to pass a privacy
statute.41 It provides damages in the amount "no less than three
hundred dollars for the knowing use [of] another's name, photograph,
or likeness. '42 Unlike the New York statute which is premised on
injury to feelings, it has been argued the California statute grants
relief for invasion of privacy on an appropriation of property theory.48
40. Id. at 451, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 508 (emphasis added). Plaintiff's second argument was
based on common law copyright. He claimed he had a copyright to his photograph. The
court in considering this argument said whether this is true or not would have to be
clarified at a later trial. The court then denied injunctive relief.
41. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1971).
(a) Any person who knowingly uses another's name, photograph, or likeness, in any
manner for purposes of advertising products, merchandise, goods or services, or for
purposes of solicitation of purchases of products, merchandise, goods or services,
without such person's prior consent, or, in the case of a minor, the prior consent of
his parent or legal guardian, shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person
or persons injured as a result thereof. In addition in any action brought under this
section, the person who violates the section shall be liable to the injured party or
parties in an amount no less than three hundred dollars ($300).
(b) As used in this section, "photograph" means any photograph or photographic
reproduction, still or moving, or any videotape or live television transmission, of
any person, such that the person is readily identifiable. 1. A person shall be deemed
to be readily identifiable from a photograph when one who views the photograph
with the naked eye can reasonable determine that the person depicted in the photo-
graph is the same person who is complaining of its unauthorized use.
(d) For purposes of this section, a use of a name, photograph, or likeness in con-
nection with any news, public affair, or sports broadcast or account, or any political
campaign, shall not constitute a use for purposes of advertising or solicitation.
(e) The use of a name, photograph, or likeness in a commercial medium shall not
constitute a use for purposes of advertising or solicitation solely because the material
containing such use is commercially sponsored or contains paid advertising. Rather
it shall be a question of fact whether or not the use of the complainant's name,
photograph or likeness was so directly connected with the commercial sponsorship or
with the paid advertising as to constitute a use for purposes of advertisement or
solicitation.
42. Id.
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In effect the California statute has granted a "right of publicity" to
each person in his name, photograph, and likeness. 44
II. LIMITATIONS TO RECOVERY IN NEW YORK AND CALIFORNIA
A. New York
While it is not expressly stated in the statute, there is a judicially
imposed limitation to its application. A person cannot recover for the
nonconsentual use of his photograph in advertisement or trade if it
was used "incidentally." 4 5 There must be a "purposeful" use of the
photograph, name, or likeness if recovery is to be permitted.46
This exception was carved out in Merle v. Sociological Research
Film Corp.47 Plaintiff claimed an invasion of privacy when defendant
photographed a building which happened to have the plaintiff's sign
on it. In considering whether there was an invasion of privacy, the
court said:
... where a man places his sign upon the outside of a building
he cannot claim that a person who would otherwise have a right
to photograph the building is precluded from using that picture
because the sign also appears on the picture. To constitute a
violation of the Civil Rights Law, I think it must appear that
the use of plaintiff's picture or name is itself for the purpose of
trade and not merely an incidental part of a photograph of an
actual building... [E]ven a use that may in a particular instance
cause acute annoyance cannot give rise to a cause of action under
the statute ....48
In order to trigger liability under the New York statute there must
be a purposeful use; the picture must be used for the purposes of
trade. In other words, the defendant must focus in on the picture,
name, or likeness so it may enhance his trade or advertisement in
some way. Plaintiff's picture need not be pivotal in that it is the most
43. Comment, Commercial Appropriation of an Individual's Name, Photograph, Or
Likeness: A New Remedy For Californians, 3 PAcIrIC L.J. 651 (1972).
44. Compare Haelan Laboratory, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d
Cir. 1953), with CAL. Civ. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1971) (the California privacy statute).
45. Stillman v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 108, 147 N.Y.S.2d 504 (Sup. Ct.
1956).
46. Moglen v. Varsity Pajamas, Inc., 13 App. Div. 2d 114, 213 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1961);
accord, University of Notre Dame du lac v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 22 App.
Div. 2d 452, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301 (1965).
47. 166 App. Div. 376, 152 N.Y.S. 829 (1915).
48. Id. at 379, 152 N.Y.S. at 832 (emphasis added).
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important aspect of the scene, but it must "add" something insofar as
the defendant's purpose of commercialization is concerned.
One obvious way to enhance a scene would be to use the name or
photograph of a famous person; but that is not the only way. A per-
son's photograph can enhance a scene not because he is famous but
because of his expression or pose. If a person's smile conveys the
precise feeling of happiness which is central to the defendant's com-
mercialization goals, the use of the picture should meet the "purpose-
ful" test.
A recent case exemplifies this point. In Negri v. Schering Corp.,49
plaintiff's photograph, nine inches high, full length, was used in a
magazine advertisement. The picture was used to catch the eye of the
reader and to focus his attention on the language of the advertisement.
The court felt it insignificant that the picture was taken 40 years
earlier. It was evident that the intended use was to catch the eye of
its readers. The court accordingly allowed recovery under the New
York statute. 50
B. California
California's statutory limitation is that the photograph must be
"directly connected" with the commercial use in order to obtain
relief.51 There has been no judicial interpretation of this phrase, but
it would seem to be very similar to New York's "incidental use" ex-
ception. The phrase ". . . connected with the commercial sponsor-
ship . . ."52 is one connoting a casual relationship. "Directly" was
used to insure recovery for uses which, in a significant way, are causes
of invasions of the property rights involved. Insignificant causes of
invasions are not within the scope of the statute. This limitation is, in
principle, then, the same as the one in the New York statute. The
direct connection with the commercial sponsorship or use means the
photograph, name, or likeness must "add" to the commercial goals of
the advertiser. By enhancing the scene the photograph is used purpose-
fully. Therefore, both New York and California limit recovery in the
49. 333 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
50. The court said that unlike Moglen v. Varsity Pajamas, Inc., 13 App. Div. 2d 114,
213 N.Y.S.2d 999 (1961), the use by the defendant was far from incidental to what the
advertisement was trying to sell and so the purpose was within the reasonable interpre-
tation of the statute.
51. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3344(e) (West Supp. 1971).
52. Id.
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same way. In both cases the use of the photograph, name, or likeness
must be a significant contribution to the scene.
III. PROPOSED FORMS OF ACTION FOR APPROPRIATION
Although courts and legislatures have recognized a right against
invasion of privacy through appropriating a property right, it has not
been determined what cause of action should be used. Courts have
not considered this question, yet it is imperative in order to analyze
appropriation further. The cause of action chosen will have important
consequences on the measure of damages applied.
Before we begin to discuss the various forms of action appropriation
can take, it would be helpful to keep these hypothetical situations in
mind:
(A) John Hood, a well-known underworld figure, was shot to death
in an east-side New York restaurant. The police sent Bill Smith to
the scene to investigate. During the course of his work, Smith is photo-
graphed by a U.P.I. photographer. The picture shows him standing
over the body smiling. The next day his picture appears on the front
page of every newspaper in the country. Fifteen years later Overmont
Picture Corporation decides to produce a fictitious motion picture
with the theme based on organized crime activity. The sole purpose
of the movie is to produce profits for Overmont and its shareholders.
The movie is never intended to be of newsworthy quality, or to dis-
seminate public information.
In one of the scenes of the movie where a rival gang member is shot,
Overmont injects the photograph of Bill Smith standing over a dead
body. The photograph is before the movie audience for no longer
than three seconds. It later comes to light that Overmont searched
through 10,000 photographs before selecting the Smith picture. Over-
mont made no effort to obtain Smith's permission in using the photo-
graph.
(B) X.Y.Z. Television in its broadcast of Saturday afternoon col-
legiate football games takes a panoramic picture of the west stands of
a Rutgers University football game. This panoramic sequence is taken
and used in a commercial film solely to produce revenue and not to
inform the public in any way.
(C) Overmont Pictures Corporation, in its advertisement for one
368
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of its movies, takes a photograph of Frank Sinatra and uses it in a
3-second sequence in its promotions for the film.
A. Trespass to Chattel
When there is a "minor" interference, not substantial enough to
amount to a conversion, trespass to chattel is the proper cause of ac-
tion on which to base one's claim for appropriation of a person's
property.53 Dean Prosser calls trespass to chattel the "little brother of
conversion. 54 In many aspects the two are similar, and in many ways
they are not. Trespass to chattel, like conversion, is exclusively a wrong
of intentional interference. 55 The requisite intent requires no wrong-
ful motive.5 So long as the defendant intentionally interferes, or in-
termeddles with a chattel in possession of another (actual or construc-
tive) or to a chattel in which one has the immediate right to possession,
there will be a trespass to chattel.57
The major problem in applying the theory of trespass to the above
examples is that the property involved is intangible. Theoretically,
intangible property is incapable of being physically possessed. Never-
theless, a photograph captures the likeness of a person. If there is an
immediate right to possess a photograph, it should be with the person
of whom the picture is taken. 5
If the theory of trespass to chattel is applied to the hypotheticals, it
can be seen that recovery will be imperative in each. In all the situa-
tions, the defendant interfered and intermeddled with the person's
exclusive right to control his image when it was used in the various
commercial sequences. In the first example, the defendant interfered
with the chattel by taking and putting it before the viewing public.
The same interference exists in the Rutgers University football game
example. Each and every person's exclusive right to control his image
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 216 (1966). See also PROSSER, supra, note 12. In
Moore v. Robinson, 109 Eng. Rep. 1346 (K.B. 1831), cutting the rope of a boat in tow was
sufficient for a trespass to chattel.
54. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 77.
55. Veltri v. City of Cleveland, 167 Ohio St. 90, 146 N.E.2d 442 (1957); accord, Northern
Pacific R.R. v. Lewis, 162 U.S. 366 (1895).
56. Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Liberty Gravel & Sand Co., 128 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. 1939);
cf. Medairy v. McAllister, 97 Md. 488, 55 A. 461 (1903).
57. "A trespass to chattel may be committed by intentionally (a) dispossessing another
of the chattel, or (b) using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possessing of another."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (1966); accord, Zaslow v. Kroenert, 29 Cal. 2d 541,
176 P.2d 1 (1946).
58. This is the position which most courts take when they discuss the rights involved
with possession of a photograph.
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has been interfered with, however, slightly. Again in the last example,
there was an interference wiih the chattel by taking and putting it
before the public in connection with an advertisement.
The theory of trespass to chattel is simply "too good" to use to
determine liability for an invasion of privacy based on the appropria-
tion theory. In each case, including the football example, the plaintiff
technically has a cause of action. Whether anything can be recovered
remains to be seen. Because of the absolute liability, the theory be-
comes unworkable. If every movie producer and television studio had
to pay people for the use of their image every time it was flashed before
the viewing public, the medium would be exposed to unreasonable
liability. Consequently, this form of action cannot be seriously con-
sidered.
B. Conversion
The nonconsentual use of a person's photograph by another for
purposes of advertisement of trade can be viewed as a conversion of a
property right. The defendant, by using the person's image, name,
and likeness, in his motion picture has converted the person's property
for his own use and may have to pay for what he has taken.
Conversion is the intentional exercise of dominion or control over
a chattel which so seriously interferes with the rights of another to
control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other full
value of the chattel. 59
Since plaintiff's property is intangible, it may not be susceptible to
a conversion. Generally, things converted are tangible rather than in-
59. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 222 A (1966). The Restatement points out that
in determining the seriousness of the interference and the justice of requiring the actor
to pay the full value, the following factors are important:
(a) the extent and duration of the actor's exercise of dominion or control;(b) the actors intent to assert a claim in fact inconsistent with the other's right of
control;
(c) the actor's good faith;
(d) the extent and duration of the resulting interference with the other's right of
control;
(e) the harm done to the chattel; and
(f) the inconvenience and expense caused to others.
In tentative draft No. 3 of the Restatement of Torts the Council by a vote of 13 to 11,
wished to strike from subsection (1), and from subsection (2), the language dealing with
"'justly requiring the actor to pay full value of the chattel." This would leave conversion
as an act of dominion or control over a chattel which "seriously interferes with the right
of another to control it." RESTATEMENT OF TORTs, Explanatory Note § 222 A (Tent. Draft
No. 3, 1958). See also Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F. Supp. 701 (D.D.C. 1969); Prosser, The Nature
of Conversion, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 168 (1957).
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tangible.6 0 Nevertheless, there has been an expansion of the concept of
conversion to include intangible rights. 61 Rights merged with docu-
ments have been held to be convertible. 62 Most cases, however, deal
with the conversion of stock certificates. There is no reason, as Dean
Prosser suggests, that there may not be conversion of a debt, goodwill
of a business, or "any species of personal property which is the subject
of private ownership." 63 Another requirement which must be met is
the element of intentional interference with possession or the imme-
diate right to possession. Since the object of conversion is the plain-
tiff's image, the plaintiff himself has an immediate right of possession,
in the sense that he alone has the right to control its use. So any inter-
ference would be with the plaintiff's right to immediate possession.
Finally, and most importantly, it is necessary to find so serious an inter-
ference with the property right that the defendant should be required
to buy the property.6 4
Relevant to the serious interference element is the "incidental use
-directly connected" test of the New York and California statutes. It
will be remembered that to have the statutes apply there must be a
purposeful use by the defendant. If there is a purposeful use of the
photograph by the defendant it can be said there is also a serious inter-
ference with the chattel. The plaintiff has the right not to have his
image projected across the movie screen or placed in an advertisement
without his consent. When the photograph is so used and it results in
an enhancement of the scene this right is disturbed. Because this right
is disturbed, the use of the photograph amounts to a serious interfer-
ence by the defendant. Dean Prosser gives a good example of serious
interference. If a person takes another's car, runs it for 4 miles, and
brings it back, there is no conversion.6 5 But if someone takes another's
car, runs it for 2,000 miles and brings it back, there is a conversion.&
In the first case, running the car for 4 miles is not a serious inter-
60. Graham v. Smith, 100 Ga. 434, 28 S.E. 225 (1897) (conversion of a dog); State v.
Omaha Nat'l Bank, 59 Neb. 483, 81 N.W. 319 (1899) (conversion of money). See also
PROSSER, supra note 12, at 81.
61. See Rubin, Conversion of Choses in Action, 10 FORDHAM L. Rv. 415 (1941).
62. Ballenger v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 266 Ala. 407, 96 So. 2d 728 (1957); accord,
Means v. Crocker First Nat'l Bank, 84 Cal. App. 2d 637, 191 P.2d 501 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948).
63. PROSSER, supra note 53, at 81-82.
64. See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222 A (1966).
65. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 92; accord, Jeffries v. Pankow, 112 Ore. 439, 229 P. 90&
(1924).
66. PROsSER, supra note 12, at 92; accord, Miller v. Uhl, 37 Ohio App. 276, 174 NE.
591 (1929).
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ference; while in the second case, running the car for 2,000 miles is a
serious interference.
Applying the "serious interference" test to the hypotheticals, it can
be seen the Smith example will result in a conversion. When the de-
fendant movie company put Mr. Smith's photograph in one of its film
sequences, it did so with a purpose-the purpose being to convey a
particular meaning from Mr. Smith standing over the dead body of a
gangster, and consequently "add" this meaning to the sequence. When
there is a purposeful use of the chattel, a serious interference exists
and there is a conversion. Nevertheless, "purposeful use" is not deter-
mined solely by the exposure time.
In the second example, the panoramic shot of the football game,
there is no serious interference. The images of the various people are
all but unrecognizable. The picture projected is of a crowd at a foot-
ball game, not "John Doe" or "Bill Pierce" attending the football
game. In other words, while collectively there is a purpose-to show a
crowd at a football game, the broadcasting company does not care if
John Doe is in the crowd or not. If he is, the intrusion on his right is
so insignificant that it does not amount to a serious interference. It
is like Prosser's example of driving a car 4 miles.
In the last example, there is a conversion. There is a purposeful use;
linking the name and face of a well-known movie star would certainly
enhance the marketability of the film. Consequently, there is a serious
interference and a conversion by the defendant.
In order to recover for appropriation, a serious interference must
take place. This requirement makes conversion a workable concept.
Not everyone will be able to recover for the appropriation of their
image, name, or likeness. Only those who have had his rights seri-
ously infringed upon will be able to recover.
C. Unjust Enrichment-Restitution
Restitution at law may provide another way to recover damages for
an invasion of privacy based on appropriation of a property right.
Where the commission of a tort results in the unjust enrichment to the
defendant at the plaintiff's expense, the plaintiff may disregard, or
"waive," the tort action and sue for restitution of the benefits con-
ferred on the defendant. 6
67. See Corbin, Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit, 19 YALE L.J. 221 (1910) [here-
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Restitution, in quasi-contract at law, looks to what in good conscience
should belong to the plaintiff.68 The amount the defendant should pay
may be more or less than what the plaintiff has lost.6 9 Restitution can-
not be used in all cases of tortious conduct. Its application is restricted
to those cases in which the court can imply, at law, a contract.70 The
remedy is limited to situations in which the wrongdoer has been un-
justly enriched by his tort, and "is under an obligation from the ties
of natural justice to refund," so the law implies a debt and gives this
action, as if a contract had been in existence.7 1 When the defendant
takes (appropriates, converts, commits a trespass to chattel) the defen-
dant's likeness and image without the plaintiff's consent, he will have
to pay the plaintiff for the benefit conferred upon him.
If the primary cause of action was trespass to chattel, each of the
plaintiffs in the hypotheticals could "waive" this tort and sue for the
benefit conferred. Since the tort itself is unworkable, the subsequent
waiver and suit in restitution would also be unworkable because hardly
a benefit has been conferred. Nevertheless, were the court to take this
approach, each and every one of the plaintiffs could recover for the
benefit conferred in the various hypotheticals.
If the plaintiff's primary basis for his action for appropriation is
conversion, he will be able to waive the tort and sue in restitution for
the benefit conferred. Unlike trespass to chattel, recovery will not occur
in all the examples. As pointed out previously, there will be a conver-
sion only in the first and third hypotheticals. Those two plaintiffs can
"waive" the tort and sue for restitution. In the second example, since
there is no tort, there cannot be the subsequent waiver. Thus, recovery
in restitution will be denied.
IV. DAMAGES
After liability for invasion of privacy premised on appropriation has
been established, and the form of action chosen, it remains to apply
the proper measure of damages.
inafter cited as Corbin]; Teller, Restitution as an Alternative Remedy, 2 N.Y.L.F. 40
(1956).
68. Felder v. Reeth, 34 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1929); accord, In re Baker, 5 W.W. Harr.
198, 162 A. 356 (Del. 1932).
69. Id.
70. See Corbin, supra note 67.
71. Id.
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A. Trespass to Chattel
As suspected, this form of action will give the plaintiff the least
amount of recovery. When there is not a substantial interference with
possession so as to constitute a conversion, but yet there still is an
intermeddling with the property, it has been held the plaintiff can
only recover actual damages suffered.
7 2
In Pearson v. Dodd,78 a United States senator claimed a trespass to
chattel had been committed against his documents, which were photo-
copied and returned to his files undamaged. The court said "the mea-
sure of damages in trespass is not the whole value of the property
interfered with, but rather the diminution in its value caused by the
interference."7 4 Actual damages to the chattel must be shown where
liability for trespass to chattel exists; without the showing of actual
damages only nominal damages can be given.7
5
Where the courts talk of actual damage, they speak of it in terms of
physical injury and diminution in the value of the chattel. Since in
all of the hypotheticals the chattel was not physically damaged or re-
duced in value, only nominal damages could be given.
B. Conversion and Restitution
Unlike trespass to chattel, a plaintiff who sues in conversion, since
it is a "forced sale," can get the value of the item "sold." The value of
property acquired by conscious tortious conduct is:
... the value of the property at the time of its improper acquisi-
tion, retention, or disposition, or a higher value if this is required
to avoid injustice where the property has fluctuated in value .... 76
If a plaintiff sues under conversion he can get the value at the time
of the conversion. 7 The recovery can be depicted as the price at which
72. See generally 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTs § 2.36 (1956).
73. 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
74. Id. at 707.
75. Id.
76. RESTATEMENT OF REnTruTION § 151 (1937); accord, Foley v. Wasserman, 319 Pa.
420, 179 A. 595 (1935).
77. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 151 (1937). But see RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION
§ 154 (1937):
[w]here a person is entitled to restitution from another because of an innocent con-
version, the measure of recovery for the benefit thus received is, at the election of the
claimant, the value of the property
(a) at the time of the conversion, or
(b) i. except to the extent that its value has been increased by the converter, its
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a willing seller in that situation under the circumstances would sell
goods to a willing buyer. In some instances, this would not be much at
all, since in our first example a willing seller in Smith's position might
sell his photograph for relatively little money. In light of the ultimate
amount of money the movie would gross, and the fact that the defen-
dant used the photograph without Smith's consent, this would be un-
fair. Because of the fluctuation in the market value, the picture is
worth much more than at the time of the conversion. Under these cir-
cumstances, a court would be justified in awarding Smith damages
measured by this later value.78
But plaintiff does not have to sue for conversion, he can sue in res-
titution. In that case the damages would be the benefit conferred
upon the defendant.79 This approach affords the plaintiff in the first
hypothetical no better relief since the measure of damage is not
plaintiff's losses, but the benefit defendant has received. A proper
measure of these damages would be the price at which a willing seller
would sell goods to a willing buyer. In the first hypothetical this would
be a small amount of money perhaps based on the going rate for an
"extra." In the third example, since Frank Sinatra is a famous person,
it would be considerably more. Then the only way a plaintiff who is
not a famous person could recover anything more would be if the
court imposed punitive damages on the defendant. These damages
are given over and above the full compensation for the injuries sus-
tained.80 They are given, in the discretion of the court, when the de-
fendant's conduct is malicious,8 ' fraudulent,82 or evil.8 3 Defendant must
exhibit a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others
so his conduct may be regarded as wilful or wanton.8 4 Mere negligence
on the defendant's part is not enough; 85 even gross negligence is in-
value at the time of a subsequent demand if the converter has property at
such time, or
ii. at the time of its disposition, if the converter disposes of it.
78. Cf. Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128, 144-45, (D. Md. 1968) (dealing with stock
certificates); accord, Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogomo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
79. The nature of the remedy is not what the plaintiff has lost as a result of defen-
dant's actions, but what benefit the plaintiff has conferred upon the defendant.
80. Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 88 (1896); see PROSSaR, supra note 12, at 9. See also
70 HARV. L. Rav. 517 (1957).
81. Cherry-Burrell Co. v. Thatcher, 107 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1940); accord, Phillip v.
United States Lines Co., 240 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
82. Prince v. State Mut. Life Ins. Co., 77 S.C. 187, 57 S.E. 766 (1907); accord, Belser v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 77 F. Supp. 826 (E.D.S.C. 1948).
83. Eshelman v. Rawalt, 298 Ill. 192, 131 N.E. 675 (1921).
84. Sebastian v. Wood, 246 Iowa 94, 66 N.W.2d 841 (1921).
85. Spackman v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 147 Mont. 500, 414 P.2d 918 (1966).
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sufficient.8 6 There must be wilful and wanton conduct.8 7 Nevertheless,
typical torts which do lead to punitive damages are libel and slander,8
intentional interference with property such as trespass,8 9 and conver-
sion.90 It may be difficult to prove wilful and wanton conduct in some
cases; but once it can be shown, the plaintiff will get the additional
relief sought.
V. PRIVILEGE AS A DEFENSE
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court deciding the most im-
portant case in the area of defamation, New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,9 1 held that the first amendment conferred a qualified privilege,
which was not limited to comment or opinion. This privilege entended
to false statements of facts, unless actual malice could be proved.92
Three years later this privilege was extended to include the tort of
privacy in Times Inc. v. Hill.93 The Hill home had been invaded by
three escaped convicts in 1952. The family was held prisoner for 19
hours. The next year a novel with several fictionalized scenes was
written about the incident. Later the novel was made into a play. In
1955 Life Magazine published an article about the play, and included
pictures of the play with the names of the members of the Hill family.
The New York courts held there was liability because there was a
misstatement of fact.94 The Supreme Court, applying the Sullivan
holding, said misstatements were privileged unless it was found to be
made with knowledge of falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth.
Nevertheless, it is important to note the plaintiff's cause of action in
Hill was based on "placing the plaintiff in a false light in the public
eye" and not appropriation.9 5
When appropriation is discussed, constitutional privilege is not a
86. Eatley v. Mayer, 9 N.J. Misc. 918, 154 A. 10 (Cir. Ct. 1932).
87. Sebastian v. Wood, 246 Iowa 94, 66 N.W.2d 841 (1921).
88. Reynolds v. Pegler, 223 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1955).
89. Huling v. Henderson, 161 Pa. 553, 29 A. 276 (1894); accord, Sperry v. Seidel, 218
Pa. 16, 66 A. 853 (1907).
90. Watkins v. Layton, 182 Kan. 702, 324 P.2d 130 (1958); accord, Jones v. Fisher, 42
Wis. 2d 209, 166 N.W.2d 175 (1969).
91. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
92. Id. at 282; see Pierce, The Anatomy of An Historic Decision: New York Times
Inc., v. Sullivan, 43 N.C.L. REv. 315 (1965).
93. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
94. Hill v. Hayes, 15 N.Y.2d 986, 207 N.E.2d 604, 260 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1965).
95. 385 U.S. at 378. It is interesting to note that the Hill case was brought under the
New York privacy statutes where recovery is based on injury to feelings.
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defense.96 By the nature of the cause of action itself the plaintiff in
a suit for appropriation attempts to recover for a purely commercial
exploitation, without any purpose on the part of the defendant to
"inform" the public by his actions. Time, Inc. v. Hill97 would apply
if the purpose of the film was to inform the public about a newsworthy
topic. Typical of this situation are news stories, news magazines,
newsreels, or documentaries. The purpose is to inform the public on
a public issue or news item. Even a "private" person involved in a
public issue would not recover for the use of his name, image, or
photograph.98
On the other hand, when the nature of the use involves private
commercial exploitation of a person's property (photograph) there is no
privilege which can be asserted. 99 If a public figure's photograph is
used in a commercial film, there is no privileged use, and the plaintiff
can recover his damages. 100 Even the President of the United States
could sue for appropriation if his photograph was used on a tee-shirt or
poster. In the context of commercial use, there is no defense of privilege
which can be asserted by the defendant.
CONCLUSION
Since 1890 the tort of invasion of privacy has been widely discussed.
But.: in the area of appropriation there is much work to be done. To
stop and call the tort appropriation is not enough; further refinement
in the concept is needed. Once it is determined what form of action
appropriation will take, movie companies will know the limits within
which they can act.
If the form of action follows trespass to chattel, the movie medium
will become too restricted and the companies will be subject to many
96. Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (Ch. 1967);
accord, Uhlaender v. Hendricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970). See also, Gordon,
supra note 2, at 562.
97. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
98. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). See generally 11 DuQ. L. REv.
100 (1972).
99. Gordon, supra note 2, at 562.
100. Id.
The statement often found in opinions of the courts that public characters lose their
immunity of privacy in the exploitation sense is not well founded. The public man is
protected against the exploitation of his personality for profit as is anyone else. Of
course, he is more frequently the subject of "news" and against news exploitation he
has no protection.
GREEN, INJURIES TO RELATIONS 118 (1940); cf. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91
(Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
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legal actions. Even the slightest interference is a trespass. Plaintiff
would still recover nominal damages if he wished. In light of this, the
form of action of trespass to chattel is unworkable and will have to
be discarded.
On the other hand, if the courts allow a cause of action for conver-
sion, they will have taken a logical approach. Conversion gives fair
recovery to the plaintiff, because the defendant has to pay for what he
has taken. Yet, this form of action has the proper safeguards to "weed
out" frivolous suits. The plaintiff has to show a serious interference to
the right to control the use of his image. Arguably this determination
will follow the New York-California "incidental use-directly connected
test." If the plaintiff's photograph, name, or likeness has been used
purposefully, the defendant should pay for his use of it. If it is then
determined that the defendant's conduct was wilful or wanton, he
should also be made to pay over and above the value of the benefits
conferred; for it is true he has invaded the plaintiff's privacy.
FRANK LEO BRUNETTl
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